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1. INTRODUCTION
The study of human capital began in the USA in the late 1950s and has yielded
important research on the rates of return to schooling, on-the-job training and
other human capital investment activities. The issue addressed in this paper is
the rate of return to formal education or schooling in China. This is studied
using a survey of income and related variables of Chinese individuals in 1988,
after China had undergone ten years of economic reform. It is of interest to
examine how the rate of return to schooling in China differs with gender, race
and Communist Party afliation, as well as to compare the estimated rates in
China with those in other countries. This analysis may shed light on how wages
are determined in different labor markets.
Jamison and van der Gaag (1987) and Byron and Manaloto (1990) both used
Chinese data to estimate Mincer-type earnings functions.
1 However, the data
used in the present study may be more informative in that they cover a broader
geographical area and contain more observations. The data here also include
variables on race and Communist Party afliation that have not been used in
prior studies.
2. THE DATA
The data used in this analysis are taken from the 1988 Chinese Household
Income Project conducted by Keith Grifn and Zhao Renwei (1993) in
cooperation with the State Statistical Bureau. Observations from both the urban
and the rural areas are used, with urban households dened as those holding
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1They analyzed data on 2154 individuals from Hui County and 800 individuals from the city of
Nanjing, respectively.urban household registrations and rural households as the remaining
households. The data set includes information gathered on 51352 individuals
belonging to 10258 rural households and 31827 individuals belonging to 9009
urban households. Because of the focus on the returns to education in this
paper, only individuals earning the relevant basic, monthly wage are included
in the analysis; those who are retired, in school, or working part-time, are
excluded.
Owing to the possible differences that may exist between the labor market
conditions in the urban and rural areas, separate questionnaires were adminis-
tered to individuals in these areas. This results in a difference in the denitions
of wage used for the two groups. The urban individuals were asked to report, if
applicable, an average basic monthly wage for 1988. For the 16917 individuals
in the urban area included in the sample, wage is the sum of basic monthly
wage and bonuses and above-quota wages. However, the rural individuals
did not report an equivalent basic wage. We have used as the rural wage
variable the average basic monthly wage which includes the basic wage as
well as various subsidies and bonuses.
2 The latter wage includes transfer
payments as well as bonuses, possibly making the denition of wage broader
for the rural individuals. The possible difference in denition of the wage
variable may affect the estimate of the rate of return to education in the pooled
urbanrural sample. It may affect to a lesser extent the separate estimates for
the urban and rural populations.
The other variables have the same denitions for the urban and rural areas
and thus should not affect the quality of the pooled regressions. Among the
explanatory variables are (1) years of education, (2) a dummy variable, equal
to one for Communist Party membership, (3) a dummy variable equal to one
for minorities and zero for Han Chinese, (4) a gender dummy variable equal to
one for females, and (5) age. Certain assumptions are made concerning years
of education (see table 1).
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Table 1. Assumptions concerning years
of education
Level of education Years of education
College or above 16
Community college 14
Professional school 14
Upper middle school 12
Lower middle school 9




Source: UN Educational, Scientic and Cultural
Organization (1965).
2A further description of the dataset is included in the Appendix.3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
This section will begin with a brief discussion of the basic regression equation
that is used throughout our analysis, and then we explain some assumptions
made in order to simplify the model. The forms of the regressions are based on
Mincers basic equation:
ln Y=b 1+b 2S+b 3E+b 4E
2+u (1)
where Y is wage, S is years of schooling, E is experience, and E
2 is experience
squared. This regression equation allows an estimate to be made of the
monetary rate of return per year of completed schooling separate from the
effects of post-school investment or experience.
3 Experience squared is
included in the model in order to account for the fact that the lifecycle of
earnings is not a linear pattern of growth (Mincer, 1958). To generate the
experience variable, we assume that the average person began his schooling at
age 6 years and that time not spent in formal schooling was spent gaining on-
the-job experience:
experience = (age  schooling 6). (2)
The rst assumption we make in the regression analysis is that the
individuals in the sample had the same average number of work hours per
month. Because the individuals did not report the number of hours they
worked each month, average hourly wage was not available. To the extent
that the number of hours an individual works is correlated with his wage and
his past education, this assumption may cause bias in our estimates of the
rate  of return to schooling. We reduce the probability of the coefcients
experiencing this bias by dropping from our sample those individuals who
worked part­time.
Another simplifying assumption of our model is that ability is not correlated
with education. There has been some evidence that this assumption is fair
(Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994). However, were our data longitudinal, we
would use an error-components model to correct for possible ability bias in the
estimates. We might also include a proxy to account for motivation or
personality. To the extent that ability may be positively correlated with both
education and wages, our estimates may be upward biased upwards.
3.1 The returns to education of China as a whole: a pooled regression
In this section we present an estimate of the monetary rate of return per
additional year of schooling completed in China. We used the pooled sample of
Chinese individuals in the urban and rural samples, with 17261 urban
observations and 1677 rural observations. The mean wages, log wages and
years of schooling are given in table 2.
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3Mincer (1974) shows that the rate of return to schooling is the proportional increase in
earnings per year of schooling if schooling and schooling level are independent and if the costs of
foregone earnings are schoolings only costs.In general, except in the case of rural individuals, the data indicate that
groups of individuals having higher average levels of education also had higher
average wages. The average years of schooling were higher for urban
individuals, males, members of the Communist Party and Han Chinese. The
preliminary observation that individuals with more schooling also had higher
wages indicates that the relationship between schooling and earnings may be
positive in nature. We investigate this possibility using regression analysis.
The rst model we test follows the specication of equation (1) and includes
four dummy variables to control for differences in gender, Communist Party
status, location (urban or rural) and ethnicity:
ln Y=b 1+b 2S+b 3E+b 4E
2+b 5Fem + b6Com + b7Rur + b8M i n+u . (3)
Running OLS on the model estimates that each additional year of schooling
yielded, on average, a 3.34 percent higher wage. With the exception of the
rural dummy, the other coefcients are all signicant at the 0.05 level and are
summarized later in table 5. The dummy variable rural, which is equal to 1
for rural observations and 0 for urban observations, is positive but insignicant
with a value of 0.022; this indicates that, all else being equal, living in an urban
or rural area did not have a signicant effect on ones wages. Given the possible
difference in denition of wage for urban and rural areas, this result should be
carefully interpreted.
In order to control for possible differences in rates of return to education
across labor markets in the rural and urban areas, a rural+schooling interaction
term is added to the model (model (4) in table 5).
4 The coefcient on the
interaction term indicates that, when the other independent variables are
restricted to have no urbanrural differences, the rate of return to education is
signicantly higher in the rural areas at the 0.05 level. The estimate of returns
to education is 4.82 percent in the rural areas and 3.20 percent in the urban
areas. The OLS estimate of the coefcient on the rural dummy is signicant at
the 0.05 level, but becomes negative instead of positive. With regard to the
effects of the various demographic variables on wages, the model predicts that
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Table 2. Average values over the pooled sample
Subgroup Log wage (yuan) Wage (yuan) Years of education
Rural individuals 4.55 119.02 6.06
Urban individuals 4.63 113.15 10.65
Females 4.54 101.57 6.96
Males 4.70 120.68 8.57
Communists 4.84 137.00 10.57
Non-communists 4.55 106.40 7.41
Minorities 4.59 108.88 6.44
Han Chinese 4.62 113.90 7.89
4Equations mentioned in the text correspond to models estimated in tables 5 and 6, but are not
necessarily written out explicitly in the text.Communists had, on average, higher wages, while females and minorities had
lower average wages, other things being equal. These results are not
unexpected.
3.2. The returns to education in rural areas
In this and the following subsection we address the possibility that tting a
model for the pooled observations may be inappropriate. We disaggregate the
sample into rural and urban subsamples, rst examining the returns to
schooling in the rural areas and then continuing with a similar analysis for the
urban areas.
Table 3 summarizes the mean values of wage, log wage and years of
schooling in the rural areas. The rural data show that, consistent with the results
in the pooled data, the mean wage was higher for Communist Party members,
males, and Han Chinese than for their respective counterparts, the non-
communists, females and minorities. The rural data also reect the pooled data
in that average wages were higher for the groups that had higher average levels
of schooling.
The rst regression includes the education and experience variables as well
as dummies for Communist Party membership, gender and race:
ln Y=b 1+b 2S+b 3E+b 4E
2+b 5Fem + b6Com + b7M i n+u .( 5 )
Table 5 shows that the coefcient on years of schooling is 0.0402, indicating
that each additional year of schooling obtained by a rural individual resulted in
a 4.02 percent increase in wage, on average. The model also predicts that, in
the rural areas, each additional year of experience resulted in a wage increase
of 1.95 percent, on average. The various dummy variables are signicant at the
5 percent level with the expected signs. The coefcient on the female dummy
indicates that, holding schooling and experience constant, females earned less
than males, their average wage being 7.48 percent lower than the average male
wage. The model estimates that a minority with a given level of education and
experience earned a wage that was, on average, 19.37 percent lower than the
wage of a Han Chinese with the same amount of schooling and experience.
We next investigate the possibility of variation in returns to schooling over
two different subgroups, gender and Party status. Running a Chow test on the
data results in our accepting the null hypothesis that the same model can be
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Table 3. Average values over the rural sample
Subgroup Log wage (yuan) Wage (yuan) Years of education
Females 4.44 103.54 4.90
Males 4.61 126.39 7.07
Communists 4.64 127.08 7.66
Non-communists 4.53 117.22 5.93
Minorities 4.42 115.49 5.09
Han Chinese 4.56 119.40 6.10used to explain wages for Communist Party members as for non-communists in
the rural areas. (Model (6) is the constrained model and (7), located in table 6
in the Appendix owing to its length, is the unconstrained model.) In order to
test differences in returns for females and males, the basic Mincer variables
(years of schooling, experience and square experience) are interacted with the
female dummy (equation (8)). The estimated rates of return to education are
not found to be signicantly different for males and females at the 0.05 level.
3.3. The returns to education in urban areas
The average values of wage, log wage and years of schooling for individuals in
the urban areas are recorded in table 4.
The OLS estimates of the basic regression
ln Y=b 1+b 2S+b 3E+b 5Fem + b6Comb7M i n+u (9)
estimate the rate of return to schooling to be 3.29 percent. Experience had a
slightly greater effect on wages; each additional year of experience resulted in a
4.50 percent increase in wage, on average. The three dummies are also
signicant at the 0.05 level, with the expected results: being a female is found
to have a negative effect on wages, being a communist a positive effect on
wages, and being a minority a negative effect, all else being equal.
From table 4 it appears that there was a fairly substantial difference in mean
wages between communists and non-communists (31.90 yuan). Although our
prior analysis found that the same earnings function may be used to explain the
wages of Party members and non-members in the rural areas, it may be
possible that two separate equations are needed to explain wages in the urban
areas. The next part of our analysis addresses the possible effects of being a
member of the Communist Party on returns to education.
In order to test for a difference in slopes between the two groups, we added
interaction terms on the schooling and experience variables. The resulting
regression
ln Y=b 1+b 2S+b 3E+b 4E
2+b 5Fem + b6Com + b7Min
+ b8Com+S+b 9Com+E+ b10Com+E
2+u (10)
has signicant t-statistics for all the coefcients. The estimated rate of return to
education for communists is a wage increase of 2.42 percent a year of
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Table 4. Average values over the urban sample
Subgroup Log wage (yuan) Wage (yuan) Years of education
Females 4.54 103.57 10.30
Males 4.71 122.01 10.94
Communists 4.85 137.44 11.69
Non-communists 4.56 105.54 10.30
Minorities 4.61 108.54 10.69
Han Chinese 4.63 113.53 10.63schooling, compared with an estimated 3.68 percent rate of return for non-
communists. This may indicate that Communist Party members have a different
wage structure from non-communists. The estimated rate of return to
experience was also lower for the communists, the OLS estimates being 4.83
percent for non-communists and 2.97 percent for communists. Although the
result is not central to the discussion in this paper, it is interesting to note that
the communist dummy variable is signicant with a t-value of 8.929. The
model estimates that, holding experience, schooling, gender and race constant,
members of the Communist Party earned wages that were, on average, 42.0
percent higher than the wages of non-members in the urban areas.
Another question is whether gender affected the rate of return to schooling.
To test this possibility, we added to the previous model a female+schooling
interaction term:
ln Y=b 1+b 2S+b 3E+b 4E
2+b 5Fem + b6Com
+ b7Min + b8Fem+S+b 9Com+S+b 10Com+E+b 10Com+E
2+u. (11)
The coefcient on the female+schooling interaction term estimates a
signicantly higher rate of return for females in the urban areas. The model
estimates that the rate of return to education was, on average, 4.46 percent for
females and 2.78 percent for males (assuming that they were not Communist
Party members). The estimated rate of return to schooling for minorities was
not found to be signicantly different from that of the Han Chinese at the 0.05
level; the results from those tests are not included in this paper.
4. DISCUSSION
When analyzing the rural and urban data separately,
5 the estimated rate of return
to schooling in China was 4.02 percent in the rural areas in equation (5) and 3.29
percent in the urban areas in equation (9). These rates of return to schooling are
low compared with similar estimates for other countries. Psacharapoulos (1985)
estimates the mean rate of return to schooling for 34 countries, all of which have
higher estimates than those found in our analysis of Chinese data. A comparison
that is particularly worthy of note is that between China and Taiwan. Although
China and Taiwan share a common culture and are in the same region, the
estimates of their rates of return to education appear to be different; China had a
lower rate of return to schooling than Taiwan, which was estimated to have a
16.1 percent rate for females and a 8.4 percent rate for males (Gannicott, 1984).
Our results are similar to those of Byron and Manaloto (1990) and Jamison
and van der Gaag (1987) in that they also found relatively low rates of return to
education in China.
6 One possible explanation for the low estimated rate is that
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5As previously discussed, the pooled estimate of the rate of return to schooling, estimated at
3.34 percent, may be difcult to interpret given the different denitions of wage in rural and urban
areas. Therefore, in this section we will primarily refer to the rates of return estimated separately
for the urban and rural areas.
6Jamison and van der Gaag estimated the rate of return to be 4.5 percent for males and 5.6


















































































































Table 5. Determinants of wage in pooled, urban and rural samples (dependent variable: log wage)
a
Independent (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (10) (11)
variable Pooled Pooled Rural Rural Rural Urban Urban Urban
Schooling (years) 0.0334 0.0320 0.0402 0.0357 0.0295 0.0329 0.0368 0.0278
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0071) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0017)
Experience (years) 0.0420 0.0419 0.0195 0.0194 0.0244 0.0449 0.0483 0.0489
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Experience squared 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Female 0.0857 0.0850 0.0748 0.0754 0.1353 0.0902 0.0898 0.2687
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0345) (0.0339) (0.1394) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0232)
Communist 0.0622 0.0629 0.0454   0.0680 0.4196 0.3599
(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0427) (0.0066) (0.0470) (0.0471)
Minority 0.0604 0.0606 0.1937 0.1937 0.1892 0.0445 0.0446 0.0451
(0.0070) (0.0141) (0.0856) (0.0847) (0.0852) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Rural 0.221 0.1183  
(0.0162) (0.0495)
Rural*schooling  0.0162   
(0.0054)
















































































































2     0.0005   
(0.002)
Female*schooling     0.0187   0.0168
(0.0120) (0.0020)
Communist*schooling       0.0126 0.0074
(0.0021) (0.0022)
Communist*experience   0.0186 0.0187
(0.0029) (0.0029)
Communist*experience
2  0.0004 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001)
_cons. 3.729 3.744 3.990 4.033 4.056 3.695 3.627 3.720
(0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0732) (0.0725) (0.0854) (0.0173) (0.0201) (0.0230)
Observations 18 491 18 491 1626 1658 1658 16 865 16 865 16 865
F-test that all of the F(7, 18483) F(8, 18482) F(6, 1619) F(5, 1652) F(8, 11649) F(6, 16858) F(9, 16855) F(10, 16854)
coefcients are jointly 867.15 757.29 18.42 20.72 14.61 1178.97 803.36 727.66
equal to zero
aMean and standard deviation of the dependent variable are: for (3) and (4), 4.625 and 0.4589 respectively; for (5), (6) and (8), 4.554 and 0.6340 respectively; for (9),
(10) and (11), 4.632 and 0.4376, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Regressions use Huber standard errors, which correct for heteroscedasticity of an
unspecied form. For a further discussion, see White (1980).the denition of wage used in the analysis does not adequately capture the total
monetary return to schooling. In China, a system based on relationships or
guan-xi exists, whereby people participate in informal trading of goods and
services in order to obtain returns for goods and services that cannot be sold or
otherwise traded in the formal market (Chow, 1994). The basic wage that
accounts for earnings in our model does not include compensation or benets
from these informal transactions. If education were positively correlated with
the ability to prosper in this informal system of guan-xi, then an estimate of the
rate of return to education not reecting informal compensation may be biased
downwards.
The estimated rate of return to schooling in urban areas of China (3.29
percent) is low compared with the estimated rate in rural areas (4.02 percent)
when they are estimated separately. Although an in-depth analysis of the
varying structures in the urban and rural areas is beyond the scope of this
paper, the difference in rate of return may be inuenced by the occupations
held by the individuals earning the relevant basic wage in the two areas. Tables
7 and 8, in the Appendix, set out the various types of employment of the rural
and urban wage earners. The most obvious difference lies in the number of
wage earners working in the state-owned or publicly owned sector. While
79.70 percent of the urban wage earners worked in the state-owned sector, only
16.49 percent of the rural wage earners worked in this sector. The majority
(69.25 percent) of the rural wage earners worked in cooperatives or farmed
under the household responsibility system. Bonnin and Carter (1988) suggest
that, in the late 1980s (when the sample in our study was taken) freedom of
choice in jobs and job mobility were greater in the individual enterprises and
cooperatives than in the state-owned businesses. Thus, the lower rate of return
to education in the urban areas may have been caused in part by the nature of
employment in the public sector, which may be less inclined to base wages
on  human capital variables such as education and experience (Cheung,
1990).
Another result is that the return to education for members of the Communist
Party in the urban areas (2.42 percent) was low relative to non-members in
urban areas (3.68), although the average wage level for Party members was 36
percent higher (equation (11)). It is interesting that, when the communist
dummy variable is equal to 1, the rate of return to education is lower. This
difference may be caused by the nature of employment within the party where
the wage structure may be based on seniority and relationships, rather than on
productivity and quality of human capital. Another possible explanation is that
Communist Party membership enables a person to get education with perhaps
fewer qualications. Were a persons ability correlated with his schooling, the
estimated rate of return to schooling would be higher for non-communists than
for communists. In any case, the high coefcient on the communist dummy
variable would seem to support the view that, in the communist system, there
may be less incentive to invest in education in order to improve wages and
more incentive to increase ones wage returns by, among other things, joining
the Party and developing seniority and relationships within it (Chow, 1994).
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This study indicates that the rates of return per year to schooling in China (4.02
percent in the rural areas and 3.29 percent in the urban areas) are low in
comparison with the rates of return in many other countries. This result may be
inuenced by the exclusion from the denition of monetary return of
compensation received by Chinese wage earners in off-market transactions.
This study also indicates that the rate of return to schooling for Chinese wage
earners in the rural areas is higher than the rate of return in the urban areas.
Within the urban areas, the rates of return for communists and non-communists
are signicantly different. While Communist Party members had lower returns
to education, they earned a signicantly higher wage than non-members.
Finally, the rate of return to schooling for females was signicantly higher than




Chinese Household Income Project, 1988. Principal investigators: Keith
Grifn, University of California-Riverside and Zhao Renwei, Chinese
Academy of Social Science, Beijing.
The Chinese Household Income Project was a joint research project done in
conjunction with the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences and the Ford Foundation. Support was also provided by the Columbia
East Asian Institute and the City University of New York. Investigators
collected the sample, consisting of 51352 rural individuals and 31827 urban
individuals, with the help of the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. The sample
includes observations from rural areas in all of the provinces excluding Tibet,
Xinjiang and Taiwan. The samples urban observations are obtained from
Liaoning, Shanxi, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Anhui, Hunan, Hebei, Gansu,
Yuannan provinces as well as from Beijing.
Those individuals who failed to report information on age, education, wage,
sex, race or Communist Party membership were dropped from the analysis, as
were part-time workers, retirees, students or those not earning the basic wage.
In addition, those individuals whose experience variable was negative were
excluded. The end results are sample sizes of 16865 individuals in the urban
areas and 1626 individuals in the rural areas.
2. Chow test comparing wage equations for communists and non-communists
in rural areas
The Chow test used in our analysis tests the null hypothesis that the b-
coefcients in the earnings function for Communist Party members are equal to
the b-coefcients in the earnings function for non-members. The test statistic is
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where the critical value for F(6,1646) is 2.10, leading us to accept our null that the
same earnings function can be t for Communist Party members and non-
members in the rural areas.
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Table 6. Test of H0: the coefcients on equations
(6) and (7) are the same




























2 0.055 0.0593.Occupations in the urban and rural areas
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Table 8. Sectors of work in the rural areas
Employment type Percent Frequency
State-owned 3.07 51
Local-state owned 13.42 223
Cooperative 50.18 834
Privately/individually owned 5.35 89
Foreign owned 0.24 4
Farming under household 19.07 317
responsibility system
Other 8.66 144
Table 7. Sectors of work in the urban areas
Employment type Percent Frequency
State-owned 40.01 6836
Other publicly owned 39.69 6782
Collective 19.83 3388
Privately/individually owned 0.06 10
Sino-foreign joint venture 0.26 44
Foreign owned 0.02 3
Other 0.12 21
Multiple ownership 0.01 2